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CONSUMER PROTECTION IN NEW BRUNSWICK*
Karl J. Doret
Any society concerned with legal aid must also concern it­
self with consumer protection. By a consumer I mean a person 
buying property or contracting for services primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes.1 There are many reasons why 
consumer protection is necessary.2 They include:
First, the great disparity in the resources of consumers and 
the business firms they deal with. Compared with the average 
dealer, the consumer lacks both knowledge and bargaining power. 
Standard form contracts, carefully prepared by the solicitors of 
the large firm, are practically unintelligible to the average con­
sumer. In many cases he enters into contracts without a full un­
derstanding of what is involved. But his problems do not end here. 
Even if he could understand all the terms of the contracts he 
makes, he could not change many terms because he lacks bar­
gaining power. Where these factors are present, the freedom 
of contract principle of the common law begins to take on an 
air of unreality. The contract changes from an instrument of 
“unofficial ^//-governm ent” to “the exercise of unofficial gov­
ernment of some by others, via private law”.3
A second reason for consumer protection is the failure of 
many businessmen to avoid the temptation of taking advantage 
of the consumer.
Thirdly, there is considerable evidence that our legal system 
has failed in many cases to further or protect the interests of the 
consumer. Although our courts have not been blind to the plight 
of the consumer, it is abundantly clear that in many areas the 
progress has been slow and uncertain. Indeed, many areas of the 
law can now be remedied only by legislation.
The reasons for consumer protection also show the problems 
involved in achieving protection. We must take steps to ensure 
that consumers are aware of their rights and liabilities. We must
* A lecture delivered to the Saint John Law Society at Saint John, N.B., 
on Feb. 11, 1970. 
t  Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick.
1 See Uniform Commercial Code § 9 - 109(1).
2 See Ziegel, Consum er C redit Regulation: A Canadian Consumer- 
O riented V iew point (1968), 68 Colum. L. Rev. 488.
3 Llewellyn, What Price Contract?  — An Essay in Perspective  (1931).
40 Yale L. J. 704, at p. 731.
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take steps to regulate and give certain consumer rights. But we 
must also take steps to devise effective methods of enforcing those 
rights, for some methods of enforcing rights are inefficient, even 
ineffective, because of their costs or administrative infeasibility. 
Finally, we should re-examine our existing system of creditors’ 
rights to see whether it is as efficient and effective as it could be 
in ensuring that creditors are paid their just debts but at the same 
time preventing undue hardship or inconvenience to either party.
Obviously, these are difficult problems. But in Canada we 
have a further problem, resulting from the split of legislative au­
thority between the provincial and federal governments. Under 
The British North America Act,4 the provinces have jurisdiction 
over property and civil rights, but the federal government has 
jurisdiction over negotiable instruments, interest, banking, bank­
ruptcy and insolvency, and criminal law. In many areas it is not 
clear who has jurisdiction and, even in those areas where 
it is clear, effective consumer protection is possible only if there 
is a high degree of cooperation between the federal and pro­
vincial governments.
My plan tonight is to discuss some aspects of the law re­
lating to the sale of goods and their financing, to point out some 
particular problems in that law as it relates to consumer trans­
actions, and to indicate some of the reform movements in our 
own and other jurisdictions.
First, the law relating to the sale of goods.
Sale of Goods
It is now more than three-quarters of a century since the 
Sale of Goods Act was drafted. And although many conditions 
in our society have changed, the Sale of Goods Act remains un­
altered. Furthermore, the Act was mainly a codification of the 
common law, and at that stage in our legal history most of the 
cases coming before the courts concerned disputes between busi­
nessmen. It is not surprising that the draftsman did not address 
himself to many of the problems consumers face today. That task 
has been left to later legislators and judges.
Misrepresentations
One problem of particular concern is misrepresentation by 
the seller. What rights, if any, does the buyer have against the 
seller for misrepresentations?
The legal effect of a representation depends on whether it 
has been incorporated as a term of the contract. If the repre­
* (1867), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 (Imp.).
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sentation is a term of the contract and turns out to be false, 
the buyer can get damages and may, if it constitutes a condition, 
rescind. If the representation is not incorporated in the contract, 
the buyer’s rights are much more limited. In fact, many repre­
sentations have no legal effect. For example, the law allows a 
certain amount of puffing. In order for a representation to have 
legal effect, it must be a representation of a material fact that 
induced the other party to enter into a contract. If such a rep­
resentation is made and turns out to be false, the buyer may have 
a remedy. The type of remedy depends on whether the repre­
sentation was made innocently or fraudulently.
The common law does not give damages for innocent mis­
representations, but does give damages in tort for deceit for fraud­
ulent misrepresentations. The test for whether a representation 
is innocent or fraudulent is whether the maker of the representa­
tion believed in its truth. A buyer cannot get damages for negligent 
misrepresentations because, although negligent, they are still inno­
cent misrepresentations under the above test. There has been 
a recent development in tort law extending liability for negligent 
misrepresentations,5 but it is still very unclear whether this will be 
carried over to the sale of goods context.
The only other remedy available for misrepresentations, which 
although not terms of the contract are such that they may have 
legal effect, is that of rescission. Rescission is the only remedy 
available for innocent misrepresentations. In the case of fraudulent 
misrepresentations, rescission is an alternative or additional rem­
edy. But this remedy will not be available if the buyer has af­
firmed the contract or restitutio in integrum is impossible (al­
though the court can make some allowance for deterioration). 
Furthermore, rescission for innocent misrepresentation will not be 
granted if the buyer has lost his right to reject the goods for 
breach of a condition under the Sale of Goods Act. Not the 
least of the buyer’s problems is the fact that it is still an open 
question whether rescission for innocent misrepresentation is avail­
able after the contract has been performed.
In 1967 the British Parliament enacted legislation to im­
prove the buyer’s position. The Misrepresentation Act, 1967,6 
allows a buyer to recover damages against his seller for negligent 
misrepresentations even though they do not form part of the 
contract. The Act also regulates disclaimer clauses purporting
3 H edley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. H eller & Partners L td. [19641 A.C.
465 (H .L.).
6 15 & 16 Eliz. II, c. 7 (Im p.).
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to exclude or restrict liability or remedies for misrepresentations. 
Furthermore, the Act provides that mere performance is not a 
bar to rescission and gives the courts discretion in some cases to 
award damages for innocent misrepresentation in lieu of rescission. 
In New Brunswick, of course, we do not have such legislation.
Obviously, the common law rules relating to misrepresenta­
tions have not deterred irresponsible sellers from engaging in mis­
leading advertising to the general public. There are, of course, 
many reasons for this —  the difficulty of proving an advertise­
ment to be a term of the contract, the difficulty indeed of proving 
that the misrepresentation is one for which the law will give any 
remedy, the difficulty in obtaining what remedies are available, 
and the expense and inconvenience to the individual consumer in 
obtaining those remedies compared with the benefits he can derive 
therefrom. Fortunately, not all sellers make misrepresentations.
Misleading Advertising
To provide better checks against those sellers who make 
misrepresentations, the federal government has enacted legisla­
tion dealing with misleading advertising. Sections 33C and 33D 
of the Combines Investigation Act7 are two very important pro­
visions. Section 33C( 1) deals with misleading price advertising. 
It provides:
Every one who, for the purpose of promoting the sale or use 
of an article, makes any materially misleading representation 
to the public, by any means whatever, concerning the price at 
which such or like articles have been, are, or will be, ordinarily 
sold, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
It will be noted that this provision catches misrepresentations as 
to ordinary price no matter how made. It would catch a shelf 
display in a store as well as a newspaper, radio, or television 
advertisement.
It is clear that the federal government now intends to en­
force this section as a number of prosecutions have been launched 
under it. The latest reported case, R. v. Thomas Sales Agencies 
(1963) L td .,9 is typical. The accused was charged under section 
33C for labelling bottles of Breck Shampoo with the words “$3.00 
Value, Special Price $1.99” . In fact, the articles in question 
never sold for the price of $3.00, but always for the price of $1.99 
or less. The accused was convicted on two grounds: first, it was a 
materially misleading representation to say “Special Price $1.99”
7 R.S.C. 1952, c. 314, as am. S.C. 1960, c. 45. s. 13. S.C. 1968-69, c. 
38, s. 116.
8 (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 208 (Ont.. Co. Ct ).
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when this was the regular price and, second, it was a materially 
misleading representation to say “$3.00 Value” when the market 
price of the article over a four or five year period was established 
at $1.99. The court held that the word “value” must be given its 
ordinary meaning, i.e., exchangeable value or market price.
One important question is whether it is a valid defence if 
the person making the misrepresentation was mistaken about the 
ordinary selling price. Must it be proved that the accused knew  
his statement was false? A number of lower courts in Ontario 
have answered this question in the negative. R . v. A llied Towers 
Merchants L td .9 is the leading case. It held that the offence un­
der section 33C (1) is one of strict liability and does not require 
mens rea. Jessup J. said that the person making the representa­
tion should bear the risk of making a false statement; the public 
should be protected irrespective of his subjective guilt or inno­
cence. In reaching his decision, he relied on section 33C (2), which 
exempts from section 33C( 1) “a person who publishes an ad­
vertisement that he accepts in good faith for publication in the 
ordinary course of his business” . If mens rea were required under 
section 33C (1), then section 33C (2) would be unnecessary. This 
decision has been followed in later cases.10 So far the courts are 
giving a liberal interpretation to section 33C.
The Combines Investigation Act has another important sec­
tion dealing with misleading advertising, section 33D, subsection 
(1 ) of which provides:
Every one who publishes or causes to be published an advertise­
ment containing a statement that purports to be a statement of 
fact but that is untrue, deceptive or misleading or is intentionally 
so worded or arranged that it is deceptive or misleading, is guilty 
of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five 
years, if the advertisement is published
(a) to promote, directly or indirectly, the sale or disposal of 
property or any interest therein, or
(b) to promote a business or commercial interest.
Section 33D (3) has a saving provision exempting the same per­
sons who are exempted under section 33C of the Act.
Up until 1969, this section appeared in the Criminal Code. 
It was shifted from the Criminal Code to the Combines Investi­
gation Act for administrative reasons. Under the Criminal Code 
this section was left to the provinces to enforce, and in fact there
9 [1965] 2 O.R. 628 (Ont. High Ct.).
10 R. v. A llied  Towers M erchantï L td., [1968] 2 O.R. 346 (Ont., Mag. 
Ct.); R. v. Thom as Sales A gencies (1963) L td . (1969), 6 D.L.R. 
(3d) 208 (Ont., Co. Ct.).
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was no real enforcement. Responsibility for enforcement now lies 
with the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the 
Minister, Hon. Ronald Basford, has served notice that his De­
partment intends to adopt a rigorous enforcement program. In 
fact, he has announced the following as examples of advertising 
to be studied with enforcement in m ind:
1. A misleading statement of fact in an advertisement.
2. The deceptive use of contests.
3. “Free” offers that are not in fact free.
4. “Bait - and - Switch” operations where the item used as bait 
is not in fact held for sale by the advertiser. This is the prac­
tice of advertising an article at an exceptionally low price 
with the intention, not of selling that article but of switch­
ing customers to other goods.
5. Contests purporting to award prizes where such prizes are 
not in fact available.
6. The “stuffed flat”.
Example: An advertiser using the classified section purports 
to be selling his household furniture whereas in fact he is 
selling goods supplied from other sources.
7. “Clip and paste” solicitations.
Example: This is a direct-mail device in which typically 
the customer is invited to verify a listing in a directory but 
which when signed and returned amounts to an order for 
which he may be invoiced.
8. Misrepresentation as to origin.
Example: A manufacturer encloses a foreign made article 
in a display package marked “made in Canada”.11
I might also add the Minister’s announcement that his Depart­
ment will draft new legislation if the present provisions are found 
inadequate to protect the consumer from misleading advertising.12
The only reported case on the new section 33D is R. v. 
Jack Anthony,™ decided by an Ontario Provincial Court in Sep­
tember, 1969. The accused was charged with the unlawful pro­
motion on television of a product supposed to be a jet ignition 
unit with transistors by making the following statement: “En­
gineered to give better gas mileage, easier starting and better per­
formance” . The charge was laid under section 33D (1 ) and (2 ) . 
Section 33D (2 ) provides:
Every one who publishes or causes to be published in an adver­
tisement a statement or guarantee of the performance, efficacy
11 Canadian Sales and Credit Law Guide Reports (CCH Canadian 
Limited, Number 23, August 29, 1969).
12 5 View From O ttaw a  213 (CCH Canadian Limited, Number 31, 
August 5, 1969).
13 Reported so far only in 1 Canadian Sales and Credit Law Guide 5077 
(Ont., Prov. Ct.).
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or length of life of anything that is not based upon an adequate 
and proper test of that thing, the proof of which lies upon the 
accused, is, if the advertisement is published to promote, directly 
or indirectly, the sale or disposal of that thing, guilty of an 
offence punishable on summary conviction.
The accused pleaded guilty to the charge and the court issued an 
order prohibiting him from continuing or repeating the offence or 
engaging in any other misleading advertising relating to his pro­
ducts.
Most provinces now have legislation dealing with misleading 
advertising also, but in many provinces the legislation is restricted 
to advertisements relating to credit. New Brunswick’s legislation, 
for example, is restricted to misleading credit advertisements.14 
However, some provinces have more general legislation. Ontario 
gives the Registrar under its Consumer Protection Act power to 
issue a cease and desist order against a person engaging in any 
misleading advertising.15
Besides these general provisions, there is other legislation 
dealing specifically with packaging, labelling, etc., of such things 
as food, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, and so on.
Direct Sales Legislation16
Another field in which provincial governments have been 
active is that of direct selling. The door-to-door seller has been 
with us for many years. He provides personalized service in the 
comfort of the home. Unfortunately, many door-to-door sellers 
have been unscrupulous and have taken advantage of consumers. 
The direct sales legislation is an attempt to prevent some abuses. 
The abuses I refer to are the increased opportunities for fraud and 
deception, the apparent impulse or compulsion purchases, and the 
fly-by-night operator who is here today and gone tomorrow.
Many of these abuses are not restricted to the direct sale 
situation. Fraud and deception are not the exclusive preserve of 
the door-to-door seller. The problem is one of degree. But there 
is one major check on the established business and that is the 
knowledge that if it wants to attract and retain the patronage of 
the consumer it cannot continually cheat him. Many door-to- 
door sellers, on the other hand, are interested only in one trans­
action. They are not interested in the consumer’s future patronage.
14 See text, infra, accompanying notes 80-81.
,s The Consumer Protection Act, 1966, S O. 1966, c. 23, s. 31, as am.
S O. 1968-69, c. 14, s. 3.
,fi See generally Cuming, C onsum er Protection  — The Itinerant Seller 
( 1967), 32 Sask. L. Rev. 113.
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Again, impulse buying is not restricted to the door-to- 
door sale situation. But again this is a matter of degree. A hard 
sell campaign, with the sales talk memorized word for word, ap­
pears to be very successful with many consumers, especially the 
housewife. Indeed, many campaigns take on the appearance of 
compulsion —  it is not uncommon to discover the main reason 
for making a purchase was to get rid of the salesman. And, of 
course, many misrepresentations are made.
Another important problem with direct sale transactions is 
that the consumer may have difficulty in enforcing his rights 
against the seller. First, he must find the seller, who may be out­
side the jurisdiction. Secondly, if and when the seller is found, 
it often turns out that he is judgment proof.
Most provinces now have legislation covering direct sale 
transactions and, happily, New Brunswick is one of them. Our 
Direct Sellers Act17 employs three principal devices to curb abuses: 
(1 ) licensing requirements, (2 ) bonding requirements, and (3 ) 
“cooling-off’ periods.
The Act applies to the direct sale of goods or services. Di­
rect selling is defined as the “house to house selling, offering for 
sale or soliciting orders for the sale of goods or services” .18 Some 
direct sale transactions are exempted because protection was 
thought to be either unnecessary or impractical.19 Thus the Act 
excludes direct sale contracts solicited, negotiated, or concluded 
at the direct seller’s normal business premises, direct sale con­
tracts made without any dealings in person between the pur­
chaser and the direct seller {e.g., goods ordered through mail 
houses), and direct sale contracts in which the goods or services 
are bought for business purposes. Direct sale contracts exempted 
because of practical reasons are those in which the goods to be 
delivered consist only of food or food products in a perishable 
state at the time of delivery and goods or services with a value of 
$25 or less.
The Act imposes licensing requirements on all direct sellers 
who have not resided in the Province for at least one year.20 
Those direct sellers who have lived in the Province for at least 
one year are exempt from the licensing requirements. The licens­
ing provisions, then, are clearly directed at outsiders.
17 Direct Sellers Act, S.N.B. 1967, c. 8, proclaimed effective June 1, 
1968, as am. S.N.B. 1968 (1st Session), c. 25, S.N.B. 1969, c. 29.
1S Ibid., s. 1(b).
Ibid., s. 3 (2 ).
20 Ibid., s. 4 (1 ).
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The licensing requirements can be, of course, a very effective 
administrative control device because a direct seller cannot carry 
on his business unless he has a license. The Director of the Con­
sumer Bureau, who administers the Act, has fairly wide discretion­
ary powers over the granting and revocation of licenses. For ex­
ample, he can suspend or cancel a license if the licensee violates 
any provision of the Act, or is guilty of misrepresentation or fraud 
in his business, or has, in the opinion of the Director, demonstrated 
an incompetency or untrustworthiness to carry on a direct selling 
business.21 Because the Director has such wide powers, the leg­
islation provides the licensee with the right to appeal to a County 
Court Judge.22
Another protection device employed by the Act is a bonding 
requirement.23 The bond provisions apply to all direct sellers. 
The purpose of the bonding requirement is to ensure that pur­
chasers having valid claims against direct sellers will receive satis­
faction of their claims. In other words, it is an attempt to 
strengthen consumer remedies. The proceeds from a bond can be 
used to pay off unsatisfied claims. Although the Act provides 
that every direct seller must provide a bond in the amount and 
form prescribed by regulation, the regulations require bonds only 
from direct sellers applying “for registration as a vendor”.24 The 
bond is to be $5,000 where five or less salesmen are employed and 
$10,000 where over five salesmen are employed.
Unfortunately, there is considerable confusion over the ap­
plication of both the licensing and bonding requirements. They 
apply to direct sellers, of course, but the problem arises over who 
is a direct seller. In the absence of statutory definitions, one 
would think that the term would embrace both the owner of the 
goods being sold, i.e., the principal, and his salesmen. If this 
were so then all of them would have to be both licensed and 
bonded. The problem arises over the fact that the Act does de­
fine a number of terms, including a direct seller, a salesman, and 
a vendor.25 The result of the various definitions appears to be 
that a direct seller is one who actually does the door-to-door 
selling. Thus, under the definitions, all salesmen would be direct
2» Ibid., s. 13(1).
22 ib id ., s. 16.
23 Ibid., s. 15, as am. S.N.B. 1969, c. 29, s. 1.
2< (N .B .) Reg. 68-42, s. 9, as am. (N .B .) Reg. 68-73, s. 1.
»  Direct Sellers Act, S.N.B. 1967, c. 8, ss. 1(c), ( f ) ,  (h ), as am. S.N.B. 
1968 (1st Session), c. 25, s. 1.
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sellers but not all owners. The only owners who would be direct 
sellers are the owners who actually door-to-door sell in person. If 
this is right, then owners who do not personally direct sell could 
argue that they are not subject to the licensing and bonding re­
quirements of the Act because these are imposed only on direct 
sellers. This could hardly be the intention of the draftsman, be­
cause throughout the Act and regulations appear references to 
vendor and salesman licenses and vendor bonds. Nevertheless, 
the provisions imposing the licensing and bonding requirements 
apply only to direct sellers.
The third protection device employed by the Act is found 
in the cooling-off provisions.26 The purpose of the cooling-off 
provisions is to give the consumer a chance to consider the ad­
visability of his purchase free from the influence of the direct 
seller. Generally, the Act has a five day cooling-off period, but 
there are some cases in which the cooling-off period is one year. 
If the purchaser decides that he wants to get out of the transac­
tion, he can do so by notifying the seller and giving back the 
goods in return for any money he has paid. The Act provides for 
adjustments where the buyer has had the advantage of partial 
consumption of goods or services.
The cooling-off provisions were opposed by many direct 
sellers on the grounds that they would introduce too much un­
certainty in commercial transactions and result in additional costs 
in cases where the goods were returned. These arguments have 
some merit, but the policy decision to protect the consumer from 
rash purchases simply outweighs them. Furthermore, it is inter­
esting to note that many large mail order houses voluntarily take 
back or exchange goods when they are returned within a reason­
able time.
Again, however, the Act and regulations are far from perfect. 
One of the keystones of such a provision is that the buyer must 
know his rights and be able to exercise them in as simple a manner 
as possible. The Act draws a distinction between written and 
verbal direct sale contracts. If the contract is in writing, section 
9 of the Act requires the direct seller to give the buyer a true copy 
of the contract immediately upon its execution. The copy is to 
include a display of the purchaser’s rights under the Act in ac­
cordance with the regulations and an address for service of the 
salesman and vendor. On the other hand, if the contract is a verbal
28 Ibid., s. 17. But s. 24 exempts the sale of certain goods and services 
from the cooling-off provisions.
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direct sale contract, the direct seller has to provide only a written 
statement setting out an address for service.27
Under the regulations, however, which purport to apply to all 
direct sale contracts, every direct sale contract is to have dis­
played on its face the purchaser’s rights under the cooling-off 
provisions of the Act.28 The draftsman of the regulations appears 
to have overlooked the distinction in the Act between written and 
verbal direct sale contracts, and insofar as the regulations pur­
port to impose these requirements on verbal direct sale contracts 
they appear to be invalid. This is unfortunate because it means 
that in verbal direct sale contracts the purchaser has less oppor­
tunity to discover his rights under the cooling-off provisions. Some 
comfort may be taken, I suppose, in the fact that probably the 
higher cost purchases will be in writing because the sale will be 
on credit. Nevertheless, it does seem rather strange that the 
purchaser should not be told his rights under verbal direct sale 
contracts just as he is under written direct sale contracts.
Assuming the purchaser is aware of his right to rescind and 
decides to exercise it, he must notify the seller in writing of his 
election. It would probably be preferable if, in addition to the 
present requirements, the direct seller were required to give the 
purchaser a self-addressed envelope at the time of the sale contain­
ing a form of rescission and a notification of the purchaser’s 
rights.29 This would give consumers a better opportunity to dis­
cover their rights and at the same time would not result in undue 
expense or inconvenience to direct sellers.
In addition to the licensing and bonding requirements, the 
Act imposes fines for violations. For a first offence the fine is 
between $25 and $100, and for subsequent offences the fine is 
between $50 and $200.30 There have been no prosecutions to date.
The Direct Sellers Act is certainly a step in the right direc­
tion, but it seems to me that it can be improved. I do hope that 
amendments will be forthcoming to clarify, correct, and adapt it. 
No doubt the Director will have a better idea of what should be 
done after seeing how the Act is working out in practice.
Implied Terms Under the Sale of Goods A ct
Returning to the Sale of Goods Act31 and assuming a valid 
contract of sale has been concluded, some important terms re­
27 ib id ., s. 10.
28 (N .B .) Reg. 68-73, s. 2.
29 Cf. Cuming, Consum er Protection  — The Itinerant Seller (1967),
32 Sask. L. Rev. 113, at p. 125.
30 Direct Sellers Act, S.N.B. 1967, c. 8, s. 26.
3> R S.N.B. 1952, c. 199.
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lating to the goods are implied by the Sale of Goods Act unless 
the parties have contracted out of them. These implied terms apply 
even though there are express terms relating to the goods, unless 
the express terms are inconsistent with the implied terms. What 
are these implied terms?
The first important implied term relates to title, quiet pos­
session, and encumbrances. There is an implied condition that 
the seller has a right to sell or will have the right to sell when 
property is to pass.32
Another important implied term deals with the sale of goods 
by description. In sales by description there is an implied condi­
tion that the goods correspond with the description.33
Furthermore, if the goods are sold by description and the 
seller deals in goods of that description, there is an implied con­
dition that the goods are of merchantable quality.34 The one pro­
viso to this is that if the buyer has examined the goods the con­
dition does not cover defects that should have been apparent on 
the examination.
It is obvious that important consequences follow from 
whether the sale of goods was by description. Many, if not most, 
consumer transactions are concerned with specific goods, i.e., 
goods identified and agreed upon at the time the contract is en­
tered into.** Are contracts for the sale of specific goods sales by 
description? The courts have clearly held that they can be. Lord 
Wright put it this way:
It may also be pointed out that there is a sale by description even 
though the buyer is buying something displayed before him on 
the counter: a thing is sold by description, though it is specific, 
so long as it is sold not merely as the specific thing but as a 
thing corresponding to a description, e.g., woollen under-garments, 
a hot-water bottle, a second-hand reaping machine, to select 
a few obvious illustrations.36
But what about the sale of goods in a self-service store? Are 
these sales by description? Should a tomato be subject to a mer­
chantability requirement depending on whether it has the word 
“tomato” printed on it?
Besides the uncertainty over what a sale by description is, 
there is also uncertainty over what is meant by the merchant­
32 Ibid., s. 13.
33 Ibid., s. 14.
34 Ibid.. s. 15(b).
3® Ibid., s. 1(1) (n ).
38 G rant v. Australian Knitting M ills, L td., [1936] A.C. 85, at p. 
100 (P.C .).
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ability requirement. One frequently quoted definition of mer­
chantability is that “the article is of such quality and in such con­
dition that a reasonable man acting reasonably would after a full 
examination accept it under the circumstances of the case in per­
formance of his offer to buy that article whether he buys for his 
own use or to sell again”.37 To be merchantable, an article must 
have both sale value and use value, but only for the general pur­
pose for which the article is used. But how long must the goods 
be merchantable? A week, a month, a year? Planned obsolescence 
had not yet been heard of at the time of the drafting of the Sale 
of Goods Act.
Another important question is whether the merchantability 
condition attaches to the sale of used goods. This question was 
raised but not answered by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
in Godsoe v. Beatty™  The plaintiff, an infant, bought a used car 
from the defendant. The evidence disclosed that before the pur­
chase he examined the used car and drove it a few miles. The 
written contract referred to the car as a “ 1953 used Meteor 
Sedan” and set out its serial number and motor number. Ritchie 
J.A., speaking for the Court, held that the implied condition of 
merchantability did not apply. After quoting extensively from 
Corpus Juris and Corpus Juris Secundum, he said that the car 
‘ was not bought on a description furnished to the plaintiff by 
the defendant” .3" It is not clear whether his view was that the 
condition of merchantability did not apply only because the goods 
were not sold by description or whether he was also of the 
opinion that it did not apply in any event to used goods.
In 1965, the same question came up before the English Court 
of Appeal in Bartlett v. Sidney Marcus, L td .40 The Court held 
that the implied condition of merchantability does apply to the 
sale of used goods. Lord Denning M.R. said that a used car 
is merchantable as long as it is “in usable condition, even though 
not perfect” .41 His test does not take into account such factors 
as the age of the article, the use to which the article has been put, 
or the purchase price, but it is clearly better than nothing.42
37 Bristol Tram w ays &c., Carriage Co. v. Fiat M otors, Ltd., [1910] 2 
K.B. 831, per Farwell L.J., at p. 841 (C .A.).
38 (1958), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 265 (N .B.C.A .).
39 Ibid., at p. 267. But cf. text, supra, accompanying note 36.
40 [1965] 2 All E.R. 753 (C .A .).
41 Ibid., at p. 755.
42 Ss. 221A and 221B of the Motor Vehicle Act, S.N.B. 1955, c. 13. 
as am. S.N.B. 1967. c. 54, s. 17, if proclaimed, will require every 
motor vehicle offered for sale to bear a certificate of roadworthi­
ness.
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Another very important implied condition relating to the 
quality of goods is that of fitness for a particular purpose. Sec­
tion 15(a) of the Sale of Goods Act states:
WJhere the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known 
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are re­
quired, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or 
judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the 
course of the seller’s business to supply, whether he be the manu­
facturer or not, there is an implied condition that the goods shall 
be reasonably fit for such purpose, provided that in the case 
of a contract for the sale of a specified article under its patent 
or other trade name, there is no implied condition as to its 
fitness for any particular purpose.
This condition is important because an article may be merchant­
able, i.e., fit for the general purpose for which the article is used, 
but may not be fit for a particular purpose a buyer had in mind. 
If the buyer can bring himself within section 15(a), he can sue 
for breach of condition of fitness for that particular purpose.
Because the courts have held that a particular purpose may 
be in fact the only purpose for which such goods are normally 
used, the conditions of merchantability and fitness for a par­
ticular purpose frequently overlap.43 This benefits the consumer 
because the goods don’t have to be sold by description in order 
for the condition of fitness to apply. However, in order to have 
the advantage of this condition, the buyer must make known to 
the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required 
so as to show that he is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment. 
Again, the courts have been very liberal to the buyer in their 
interpretation of these requirements. For example, it is assumed 
that the buyer relies on a retailer to choose suitable goods.44 And 
as Lord Wright put it in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd.:
TTlhere is no need to specify in terms the particular purpose for 
which the buyer requires the goods, which is none the less the par­
ticular purpose within the meaning of the section, because it is 
the only purpose for which any one would ordinarily want the 
goods.45
Furthermore, the courts have interpreted the proviso dealing with 
sales under a patent or trade name in such a way that it applies 
only when in ordering the goods under their patent or trade name 
the buyer is showing the seller that he is not relying on his skill 
or judgment.46
43 G rant v. Australian Knitting M ills, L td., [1936] A.C. 85 (P .C .).
44 Ibid., at p. 99.
«  Ibid.
46 Baldry v. M arshall [1925] 1 K.B. 260 (C .A .).
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Still, there can be great difficulties in applying this section. 
In Godsoe v. B ea tty41 the New Brunswick case I mentioned a 
few minutes ago of the infant purchasing the used car, you will 
recall that the infant examined the car and drove it for a test run 
before purchasing it. The Court held that the implied condition 
of fitness for a particular purpose did not apply because “the 
plaintiff did not make known to the defendant any particular 
purpose for which the car was required”.48 But other courts have 
held that the particular purpose may be the only purpose for 
which the goods are normally used and that the seller will be 
taken to know this purpose.43 Another reason given by the 
Court in the Beatty case was that the plaintiff did not rely on the 
defendant’s skill or judgment.50 Although section 15(a) can apply 
notwithstanding an examination of the goods by the buyer, if the 
examination is taken to indicate a lack of reliance on the seller’s 
skill or judgment the buyer will not be able to bring himself 
within the section. This raises the question whether the condition 
of fitness for a particular purpose would apply to the sale of goods 
in a self-service store. The self-service buyer might also have 
difficulty with the proviso to section 15(a).
The last implied condition I want to mention arises in sales 
by sample.51 In sales by sample there is an implied condition that 
the bulk correspond with the sample in quality and answer the 
description, if any, under which the goods were sold. There is 
also an implied condition of merchantability except for defects that 
should have been apparent on a reasonable examination of the 
sample.
Remedies
Turning from the terms of the contract of sale to remedies 
for their breach, the buyer’s remedies depend on whether the term 
is a condition or warranty. A buyer can rescind the contract only 
if there has been a breach of condition. He must content himself 
with damages for breach of warranty. The right to rescind for 
breach of a condition is usually lost if the buyer has accepted the 
goods or “the contract is for specific goods the property in which 
has passed to the buyer”.59 The latter is a great hurdle to many
47 See text, supra, accompanying note 38.
4S (1958), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 265, at p. 267.
49 See, e.g., Freeman v. C onsolidated M otors Ltd. (1968), 69 D.L.R. 
(2d) 581 (Man. Q.B.).
50 But see Freeman v. C onsolidated M otors Ltd., ibid.
51 Sale of Goods Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 199, s. 16.
52 Ibid., s. 12(4).
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consumers because first, as I mentioned earlier, many consumer 
transactions are for the sale of specific goods, and second, ac­
cording to section 19 rule 1 of the Act, unless a contrary intention 
appears, “where there is an unconditional contract for the sale 
of specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods 
passes to the buyer when the contract is made”. Applied literally, 
this would mean that in many cases the right to reject would arise 
and be lost at practically the same moment, the making of the 
contract. Some courts have avoided this problem by ignoring it53 
or by applying rather questionable interpretations,54 while other 
courts have given the Act its literal interpretation.55
It is submitted that the only satisfactory solution to this 
problem is to repeal the words “or where the contract is for 
specific goods the property in which has passed to the buyer” in 
section 12(4). The Molony Committee on Consumer Protection
said:
. . .  on the ordinary consumer sale the consumer is deprived of 
his right of rejection at the moment when he agrees to buy. If he 
finds the goods to be defective as soon as he gets home he has 
no right to return them. If the shopkeeper declines to take them 
back the purchaser is entitled in law only to sue him for damages. 
What he wants is to get his money back. We regard this posi­
tion as deeply unsatisfactory. With elaborate packaging precluding 
inspection, and the impossibility of testing the operation of 
appliances in the shop, the consumer is often buying in ignorance.
The value of the article usually discourages resort to Court ac­
tion and a minority of retailers rest secure in this knowledge.5fi
Their recommendation was adopted in the English Misrepresen­
tation Act, 1967.57 In England, a buyer will lose his right to 
reject only if he has accepted the goods.58
Disclaimer Clauses
So far we have been discussing the buyer’s rights and 
remedies because of misrepresentations or express or implied 
terms of the contract. But one of the greatest stumbling blocks 
to consumer protection in the sale of goods area is the widespread 
use of disclaimer clauses. Under such a clause the seller attempts
53 L eaf v. International Galleries, [1950] 2 K.B. 86 (C .A.).
54 Varley v. W hipp, [1900] 1 Q.B. 513.
55 See H om e G as Ltd. v. Streeter, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 842 (Sask. C. A .).
56 Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection (Cmnd. 
1781, 1962), para. 460.
57 (1967), 15 & 16 Eliz. II, c. 7, s. 4 (1 ) (Imp ).
58 Another important improvement made by the Misrepresentation Act, 
1967. was to provide that in cases of conflict between the English
equivalents to our sections 32 and 33, section 32 will prevail: s. 4 (2 ) .
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to contract out of or limit obligations that would otherwise be 
imposed on him. The Sale of Goods Act allows this on the free­
dom of contract principle.59 This principle is both desirable and 
necessary in business transactions, but it can result in unfairness 
and oppression if blindly applied in consumer transactions, apart 
altogether from the fact that disclaimer clauses are frequently 
buried in fine print on the back of the printed contract.
The courts are well aware of this problem and have gone 
great lengths to get around some of the more obnoxious clauses.60 
They have done this under the guise of the interpretive process. 
This has resulted in a contest between the draftsman and the 
judge —  both have displayed great ingenuity. The courts, con­
struing such clauses very strictly, have held that the exclusion of 
warranties does not exclude conditions, that the exclusion of im­
plied terms does not exclude express terms, and so on. The drafts­
man has countered with something like this:
This agreement constitutes the entire contract between the parties 
and there are no representations, warranties, conditions, or col­
lateral agreements, express or implied, statutory or otherwise, 
except as herein contained.
And, of course, the agreement itself may contain little. This 
sweeping disclaimer clause appears formidable, but it has not 
deterred courts from avoiding it, provided they had something to 
work with and the merits of the case were such as to move them 
to look for a way out. Thus the courts have held such clauses 
to be overridden by express oral statements at the time the con­
tract is entered into,61 or to be inoperative because of misrepre­
sentation of their effect.62
Perhaps the greatest avoidance device developed so far by 
Anglo-Canadian judges is the doctrine of fundamental breach. 
This doctrine has sparked a continuing controversy over its true 
nature and legitimacy. It is said to be a rule of construction 
under which a so-called fundamental obligation falls outside the 
scope of an apparently all inclusive disclaimer clause.63 Its ap ­
plication is even more difficult than its analysis. But it has enabled 
courts to effect practical justice in many cases, although at the
M R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 199, s. 52.
80 See Atiyah, The Sale of Goods (3rd ed., London, 1966), c. 13.
61 See, e.g., Couchm an  v. Hill, [1947] K.B. 554 (C .A .).
62 See, e.g., Curtis v. Chem ical Cleaning and Dyeing Co., [1951] 1 
K.B. 805 (C .A.).
83 Suisse A tlantique Société D ’A rm em ent M aritim e S.A . v. N .V . 
Rotterdam sche Kolen Centrale, [1967] 1 A.C. 361 (H .L.).
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expense of certainty. Our courts have preferred the interpretive 
process to the more radical doctrine of unconscionability under 
which some disclaimer clauses are struck down as being against 
public policy.64 This reliance on the interpretive process alone is 
regrettable65 and has inhibited the proper development of the 
difficult but necessary doctrine of unconscionability.
In fact, there is much to be said for legislative regulation for­
bidding a dealer from contracting out of certain implied terms in 
consumer transactions. This has been done in England66 and in 
other parts of the Commonwealth.67 In Canada, Saskatchewan 
regulates the terms in conditional sale agreements,68 although why 
protection should be limited to conditional sale agreements is 
somewhat of a mystery. Manitoba, in its new Consumer Protec­
tion Act of 1969, regulates the contracting out of certain 
statutory terms in all retail sales.69 Of course, there are consid­
erable problems and disagreement over what terms should be 
regulated but, except in cases of used goods and specified defects 
pointed out to the consumer at the time the contract is entered 
into, why not consider forbidding the contracting out of sections 13 
through 16 of our Sale of Goods Act in consumer transactions?
Finally, there is a whole host of miscellaneous statutes 
regulating the quality of such things as food, cars, tires, medicine, 
and so on.
Third Party Recovery for Defective Goods70
Another important area of consumer protection is the liabil­
ity of a seller or manufacturer of defective goods to persons who 
are not parties to the contract of sale. Because of the privity 
of contract barrier, a third person who is injured by defective 
goods can recover only in tort for negligence. We have not
64 Henningsen v. Bloom field M otors, Inc. (1960), 161 A. 2d 69 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct.).
** I am not suggesting that the doctrine of fundamental breach is an 
illegitimate device. It is not. Nor am I suggesting that it was 
developed as a consumer protection measure. It was not. But what 
I am suggesting is that courts are now using the doctrine as a 
consumer protection device.
M Hire-Purchase Act 1965, 13 & 14 Eliz. II, c. 66, ss. 17, 18 (Imp.).
®7 See Ziegel, N ew  South Wales Hire-Purchase Legislation  (1962), 25 
Mod. L. Rev. 687.
The Conditional Sales Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 393, ss. 25, 28.
*n The Consumer Protection Act, S.M. 1969 (2nd Session), c. 4, s. 58. 
T0 See Linden, A Century o f Tort Law  in C anada: W hither Unusual 
Dangers, Products L iability and A utom obile Accident Com pensation?  
(1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 831, at pp. 849-864, 870-874.
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adopted the doctrine of strict liability. Some American juris­
dictions have, for various reasons. First, there is a certain amount 
of “deep pocket” feeling, i.e., let the rich guy pay. But that is 
not all. There is a feeling also that the manufacturer or seller is a 
better loss bearer because it is much easier for him to spread 
losses by raising the prices of his products to cover these costs and 
thereby spreading them to all persons using his products. There 
is also believed to be a very important deterrence factor. If the 
persons who produce defective products have the costs of those 
defective products thrown back on them, presumably they will 
have some incentive to devise better products so as to reduce the 
costs.
This is a very oversimplified picture, but it does give some 
idea of the policies on which some American courts are proceed­
ing. But even courts that have adopted strict liability are still 
faced with some rather difficult policy decisions. For example, 
for what losses should there be strict liability? Personal injuries 
are covered, but what about property damage and what about 
economic losses? And on whom should the strict liability be im­
posed? Retailers? Distributors? Manufacturers? All parties in 
the marketing chain? The American courts will be deciding these 
issues in this decade.
Consumer Credit
So far I have discussed the sale of goods only and have not 
considered the sale of goods on credit. But the Canadian con­
sumer credit industry is now a ten billion dollar venture and 
there is increasing concern over the effects of its growth on both 
the individual user and the general economy. We are concerned 
with the cost of credit, the types of security taken, the rights and 
remedies of the parties on default, the general position of the 
financing institution, and what to do with the debtor who finds 
himself hopelessly over his head.
Cost of Credit
Concern over the cost of credit has resulted in two different 
kinds of legislation: legislation requiring the disclosure of the cost 
of credit and legislation regulating the cost of credit. Until fairly 
recently, we relied mainly on free market forces to fix the cost of 
credit. But the proper working of the free market system depends 
on two vital factors: (1 ) competition and (2 ) consumers who are 
aware that competition exists and who are able to take advantage 
of it. The existence of both these factors has been questioned in 
the consumer credit industry.
Before the enactment of effective disclosure legislation, it 
was very difficult for a consumer to find out the true cost of
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credit because of the amazing variety of methods of calculation 
employed by different lenders. The object of the recent dis­
closure legislation, in New Brunswick The Cost of Credit Dis­
closure Act,71 is to let the consumer know the actual cost of 
credit and to enable him to easily compare the cost of credit 
from one lender as opposed to other lenders.
New Brunswick’s Cost of Credit Disclosure Act covers credit 
extended by both lenders and sellers of goods or services. The 
Act excludes from its operation72 credit secured by a mortgage 
on real property, or given on the sale of goods intended for resale, 
or given for industrial or business purposes. The Act also ex­
cludes credit transactions that amount to less than $50, presum­
ably for practical reasons.
The Act requires the cost of credit to be disclosed in two 
ways; first, in terms of dollars and cents, and secondly, in terms 
of an effective annual percentage rate.73
The Act is an improvement over prior legislation in two major 
respects. First, it defines the cost of borrowing74 and thereby 
avoids the problems that have arisen under the federal Interest 
Act.75 There is now an entire body of law dealing with the dis­
tinction between interest and bonus payments, and lenders have 
been able to get around the disclosure requirements of the In­
terest Act, at least in part, by stipulating for bonuses or other 
charges that are not interest in its strict meaning.76 The Cost of 
Credit Disclosure Act, however, defines the cost of borrowing so 
as to focus on the difference between the total sum that the 
borrower is required to pay and the total sum that he actually 
receives. Since The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act gives a better 
disclosure of the true cost of borrowing, it is unfortunate that real 
estate mortgages are exempted from its provisions.
This is not to say that The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act 
solves every problem. Far from it. For example, in credit sales 
one of the things to watch for under the new legislation is whether 
sellers try to hide part of the credit cost by inflating the so-called 
“cash price” of the goods. If they do try this and are successful.
71 S.N.B. 1967, c. 6, proclaimed effective June 1, 1968; (N .B.) Reg. 
68-43.
70 The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act, S.N.B. 1967, c. 6, s. 1(f).
73 Ibid., s. 14.
74 Ibid., s. 1(e).
75 R.S.C. 1952, c. 156.
7fi See Sinclair, Interest and Bonus Paym ents in the Law of M ortgages 
(1964), 14 U.N.B.L.J. 35.
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the effectiveness of the disclosure provisions will be considerably 
diminished.
The other major improvement which The Cost of Credit 
Disclosure Act makes over previous legislation is that it lays 
down the method of calculating the interest rate, the purpose of 
which is to come as close as possible to the effective annual rate. 
The details are found in the regulations.77 It should be noted, 
however, that the Act distinguishes between variable and non­
variable credit. Variable credit means the various types of open- 
ended credit such as revolving credit accounts and budget a c ­
counts.78 Since the balance in such accounts may change from 
month to month, the Act contains special provisions for disclosing 
the cost of credit under these arrangements.79
Besides requiring a lender, before extending credit, to provide 
the borrower with a written statement disclosing the cost of the 
credit in terms of dollars and cents and as an effective annual per­
centage rate, the Act also contains provisions regulating advertis­
ing by lenders.80 For example, the Act provides that a lender 
shall not advertise his charge for credit unless it includes the full 
cost of borrowing in dollars and cents and as an effective annual 
percentage rate. The Act also regulates advertising relating to 
other terms of the credit transaction. The Director of the Con­
sumer Bureau may order the stoppage of misleading advertise­
ments.81 Misleading credit advertisements would also fall within 
section 33D of the Combines Investigation Act.82
Every lender must be registered before he can carry' on 
business as a lender,83 and there are provisions for the suspension 
or cancellation of a lender’s registration.84 The Minister may re­
quire any lender to provide a bond or collateral security as pre­
scribed by regulation.85 We saw earlier that the Direct Seilers 
Act imposes licensing and bonding requirements also.86
77 (N .B .) Reg. 68-43. ss. 9, 10.
78 The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act, S.N.B. 1967, c. 6, s. l(n ) .
79 Ibid., s. 14(2); (N .B.) Reg. 68-43, s. 10.
s0 The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act, S.N.B. 1967, c. 6, s. 17; (N .B.) 
Reg. 68-43, ss. 12, 13.
81 The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act, S.N.B. 1967, c. 6, s. 13.
82 See text, supra, accompanying notes 7-15.
The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act, S.N.B. 1967, c. 6, s. 5.
84 Ibid., ss. 7. 8, 9, 10.
8* Ibid.. s. 26.
86 See text, supra.
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The penalties for violating The Cost of Credit Disclosure 
Act are heavier than those under the Direct Sellers Act. A person 
who violates The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act is liable on sum­
mary conviction to a penalty of not more than $2,000 or to im­
prisonment for a term of not more than one year, or both. Cor­
porations can be fined up to $25,000.87 Furthermore, a lender 
who fails to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Act 
can recover from the borrower only the amount of the principal 
plus any portion of the cost of borrowing that was disclosed in 
accordance with the Act’s requirements.88
In addition to the recent disclosure legislation, there is also 
legislation regulating the actual cost of credit. In fact, the legis­
lation regulating the cost of credit predates the recent disclosure 
legislation. However, one very strange fact about most of the 
legislation regulating the cost of credit is that it applies only to 
money-lending transactions and not to credit sales.
The federal Small Loans Act89 goes back to 1939 and applies 
to loans up to $1,500. The maximum rates permitted under this 
Act are 2%  per month on the first $300, 1%  per month on 
the next $700, and i%  per month on the next $500.90 One of 
the most frequent criticisms of this Act is that it does not apply 
at all to loans over $1,500. The charge is also made that there is 
a tendency for lenders to charge the maximum rates allowed by 
the Act.
The debate over whether actual rate regulation is desirable 
or possible is likely to continue for some time. The process of 
setting a fair rate is extremely complicated, because the interest 
rate must take into account not only the fact that the lender 
should be compensated for the use of his money but should also 
take into account the risk factor involved. In many cases, what 
would appear at first glance to be an exorbitant interest rate merely 
reflects a high risk factor. And it is precisely this differing risk 
factor that makes the setting of a uniform rate very difficult. If 
the rate is set too low, many people will be cut off from the market. 
And even assuming that some people should be cut off from the 
market, there remains the difficult problem of drawing that line 
by legislation. If the rate is set too high, you will catch only the 
most flagrant abuses and may encourage lenders to increase their 
interest rates.
87 The Cost of Credit Disclosure Act. S.N.B. 1967. c. 6, s. 23.
88 Ibid., s. 15.
** R.S.C. 1952, c. 251, as am. S.C. 1956, c. 46.
90 Ibid., s. 3.
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The various provincial Unconscionable Transactions Relief 
Acts deal with the problem of regulating the cost of borrowing 
on a case by case basis. It may seem rather odd that the prov­
inces have legislated in this field at all, because under The British 
North America Act interest is a federal responsibility. And there 
is that rather imposing provision of the Interest Act,91 section 2, 
which states:
Except as otherwise provided by this or by any other Act of the 
Parliament of Canada, any person may stipulate for, allow and 
exact, on any contract or agreement whatsoever, any rate of 
interest or discount that is agreed upon.
Nevertheless the Supreme Court of Canada has held the provincial 
Unconscionable Transactions Relief Acts to be valid.92 Our Act 
allows a court to re-open a money-lending transaction when it 
finds that, having regard to the risk involved and to all the other 
circumstances, the cost of the loan is excessive and the transaction 
is harsh and unconscionable.93
Secured Transactions
Another area of consumer credit causing increasing concern 
is what happens when a buyer or borrower goes into default on 
his payments. The rights of a creditor depend on whether his 
debt is secured or unsecured. A secured creditor has the addi­
tional advantage of real remedies.
In Canada, the two most common types of chattel security 
are the chattel mortgage and the conditional sale, and of these two 
the latter is more common. Under both chattel mortgages and 
conditional sales, title is being transferred to or reserved in the 
creditor or seller for the purpose of security. Notwithstanding 
this similar purpose, there are important differences depending 
on which type of security is used. This is because in conditional 
sale agreements the common law focuses most of its attention on 
the sale aspects of the transaction and tends to overlook the 
security aspects of the transaction. The result is a difference in 
the position of a chattel mortgagor and a conditional buyer.94
Thus, in contrast to a chattel mortgagor, a conditional buyer 
does not have any redemption rights at common law. This re­
91 R.S.C. 1952, c. 156.
92 A ttorney-G eneral for Ontario v. Barfried Enterprises L td., [1963] 
S.C.R. 570.
93 Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, S.N.B. 1964, c. 14, s. 2.
94 See generally Goode and Ziegel, Hire-Purchase and Conditional Sale: 
A Comparative Survey of Commonwealth and American Law (Lon­
don. 1965), at pp. 13-15, 136-146.
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suited in hardship in cases where a conditional buyer went into 
default after having made substantial payments on the purchase 
price of the article. As far back as 1899, New Brunswick intro­
duced legislation giving a conditional buyer certain rights ana­
logous to those of a chattel mortgagor,95 but the legislative changes 
were and are a long way from assimilating the rights of a con­
ditional buyer with those of a chattel mortgagor. In New Bruns­
wick, the form of the transaction is very important in determining 
the rights and duties of the parties. We have not yet adopted the 
American approach of looking at the substance of the transac­
tion.96 Ontario has.97
Section 14 of our Conditional Sales Act98 requires a condi­
tional seller who has exercised his repossession rights to hold the 
goods for a twenty day period and gives the buyer a redemption 
right during this twenty day period. In order to redeem, the 
buyer must tender the costs and expenses of repossession plus 
either “the amount then due on the contract price” or the balance 
of the purchase price.
There are at least two problems concerning the buyer’s 
redemption right. First, section 14 does not require the seller to 
notify the buyer of his redemption right. Why this is not re­
quired is somewhat of a puzzle. It is true that if the seller wants 
to retain a right to sue for a deficiency he must serve a notice on 
the buyer containing the information required by section 14(4), 
but no notice is required if the seller does not intend to look to 
the buyer for a deficiency. The usual case where the seller will 
not intend to look to the buyer for a deficiency is the case where 
he does not expect a deficiency. And that is the case where the 
buyer has made substantial payments on the purchase price of 
the article so that the balance owing is less than the market 
value of the article. But surely this was one of the reasons for 
passing the legislation, to protect the buyer’s interest in goods 
on which he has made substantial payments. It is submitted 
therefore that the seller should be required to notify the buyer 
of his rights, especially when it is remembered that the buyer must 
redeem within twenty days of repossession.
Another problem under section 14 is the effect of an ac­
celeration clause on the buyer’s redemption right. Most security
95 An Act Respecting Conditional Sales o f Chattels, S.N.B. 1899, c. 12, 
s. 6.
96 Uniform Commercial Code — Secured Transactions, Article 9.
97 The Personal Property Security Act, 1967, S.O. 1967, c. 73.
9* R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 34, as am. S.N.B. 1955, c. 32, S.N.B. 1959, c. 35,
S.N.B. 1965, c. 13.
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agreements contain acceleration clauses under which the creditor 
can declare the entire debt due on default in payment of any 
instalment. Does this mean that the buyer must tender the ac­
celerated balance in order to redeem? This depends on the 
interpretation of the words “the amount then due on the contract 
price”. There are conflicting decisions on similarly worded sec­
tions in other jurisdictions. In Peresluka v. General M otors 
Acceptance Corp. of Canada L t d Hall J., of the Manitoba 
Queen’s Bench Division, denied effect to an acceleration clause, 
saying that to hold otherwise would in most cases destroy a 
buyer’s redemption right. But in Delta Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v. 
N ovits,100 Colter C.C.J., of the Ontario County Court, gave full 
effect to an acceleration clause, pointing out that under mortgage 
law a mortgagor could redeem only by paying the full amount 
of the mortgage balance.
As a matter of policy, it is difficult to decide what the 
position should be. The seller inserts an acceleration clause for 
a very good reason. He does not want to be stuck with a debtor 
who consistently misses payments —  the time, trouble, and ex­
pense of collecting each instalment from a “deadbeat” are well 
known. Furthermore, there is in many cases legitimate concern 
over what will happen to the security. On the other side of the 
coin, however, is the fact that section 14 of the Conditional Sales 
Act confers only limited redemption rights and the buyer may end 
up losing all rights to the goods if he does not redeem within the 
twenty day period. A mortgagor, on the other hand, can redeem 
at any time before foreclosure or sale. The ideal solution would 
be to amend the section and make the rights of the conditional 
buyer more closely analogous to those of the chattel mortgagor.
Another problem, and one that is common to both condi­
tional sale agreements and chattel mortgages, arises when the 
creditor exercises a power of sale. From a consumer protection 
viewpoint, there are two very important complicating factors here. 
First, we must remember that the sale of second-hand consumer 
goods will in many cases yield very little. In these cases the 
debtor suffers a double loss, in that he not only loses the goods 
but remains liable for a large deficiency. I am aware, of course, 
that the same thing can happen in a sheriffs sale under a writ of 
execution. But in secured transactions we have the additional 
complicating factor that the sale of the property is an extra­
judicial proceeding. It is not conducted under the supervision of
99 (1966), 56 D.L.R. (2d) 717 (Man. Q.B.).
100 (1968), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 208 (Ont., Co. Ct.).
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an officer of the court. And while it is true that the secured party 
must act bona fide and use reasonable efforts to obtain a good 
price for the property being sold, in practice it will be difficult to 
prove that the secured party did not live up to his obligations.101 
Unless the amount involved is substantial, the consumer is not 
likely to resort to litigation in the face of such uncertainty.
Solutions to these problems are hard to come by. Sas­
katchewan limits a conditional seller’s rights to repossession of 
the goods sold and denies all personal remedies against the 
buyer.102 But this solution, although it undoubtedly protects con­
sumers, can result in hardship to the seller. Some provinces re­
quire a conditional seller to make an election between suing for 
the purchase price without repossession or repossessing the goods 
sold and giving up the right to look to the purchaser for any de­
ficiency.103 Ontario requires a seller to obtain a court order before 
he can repossess goods on which the buyer has paid two-thirds of 
the purchase price or more.104
Perhaps what we should do is take a new look at creditors’ 
rights law generally and make more attempts to concentrate on a 
debtor's main asset, his income, through schemes whereby the 
debtor is given a chance to keep his goods and pay off his debts 
in instalments free from constant harassment. Our present law re­
lating to garnishment and assignment of wages leaves much to be 
desired from all viewpoints. Not the least of the problems is the 
fact that the debtor may end up losing his job because his employer 
does not want to be bothered with the trouble of deducting the 
payments from his pay cheque.
Financing Institutions
I will conclude this lecture with a brief reference to some 
recent developments relating to financing institutions, for it is the 
financing institutions that make possible our ten billion dollar 
consumer credit industry.
The consumer who buys goods on credit from his seller and 
later discovers that the goods are defective has a more effective 
remedy than the consumer who pays cash or buys them with a 
loan from a third party, because he can set off his claim for the
101 Bay M otors Co. Ltd. v. Traders Finance Corp. L td. (1959), 19 D.L.R. 
(2d) 331 (N.B.C.A.): J. & W. Investm ents Ltd. v. Black (1963),
38 D.L.R. (2d) 251 (B.C.C.A.).
102 The Limitation of Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 103, s. 18.
103 See, e.g., The Conditional Sales Act, 1955, S. Nfld. 1955, No. 62, s. 
12, as am. S. Nfld. 1962, No. 67, s. 2.
104 The Consumer Protection Act, 1966, S.O. 1966, c. 23, s. 20.
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defective goods in an action against him by the seller for the pur­
chase price.105 This is a very important practical advantage. The 
problem, however, is that most dealers do not actually carry credit 
but rather sell their paper to financing institutions who make every 
effort possible to insulate themselves from any defences a buyer 
may have against his seller.106 Two devices are used in order to 
get around the rule that an assignee takes subject to the equities.107
The first device is to insert in the sale agreement itself a so- 
called “cut-off” clause. Under such a clause the buyer agrees not 
to assert against the seller’s assignee any defences that the buyer 
may have against the seller. The Second device is to get the buyer 
to sign a promissory note in favour of the seller which later on 
will be endorsed to the finance company. The object of this, of 
course, is to obtain a holder in due course status under the Bills 
of Exchange Act.108 Thus, when the dealer sells his paper to the 
financing institution the intended result is that the financing in­
stitution will collect the full purchase price from the buyer com­
pletely free from any claims the buyer might have against the 
seller, relying on the cut-off clause and its holder in due course 
status. It will also have the benefit of the security.
This set-up was allowed by the Supreme Court of Canada 
as far back as 1921 when it decided Killoran v. Monticello State 
Bank,109 even though the only thing separating the promissory 
note from the conditional sale agreement was a perforated line. 
For forty years the Killoran case was followed without question. 
There was no real concern over the underlying relationship be­
tween the dealer and the financing institution. In New Bruns­
wick the leading case is Aetna Factors Corp. Ltd. v. Breau.un
But in 1962, Kelly J.A., of the Ontario Court of Appeal, in 
Federal Discount Corp. Ltd. v. St. Pierre111 denied a holder in 
due course status to a finance company because of a close 
connection between it and the dealer. He did not rely on bad
105 Sale of Goods Act. R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 199, s. 50(1).
106 See generally Ivan R. and Kristine Feltham, Retail Instalment Sales 
Financing — R ights of the Assignee-Endorsee — Identification of the 
Finance C om pany With the D ealer to Protect the Buyer (1962), 40 
Can. Bar Rev. 461.
107 In many cases sweeping disclaimer clauses, prepared by financing in­
stitutions for use by dealers, reduce buyer rights against sellers to a 
minimum in any event. See text, supra.
108 R.S.C. 1952, c. 15, as am. S.C. 1966-67, c. 12, S.C. 1967-68, c. 7.
109 (1921), 61 S.C.R. 528.
1,0 (1957), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 326 (N.B.C.A.).
111 [1962] O R . 310; 32 D.L.R. (2d) 86 (Ont. C. A .).
U.N.B. L A W  J O U R N A L 93
faith but rather on the business relationship between the dealer 
and financing institution. He said:
With the growth of the sale of household and personal goods 
on the extended payment plan, the promissory note, the conditional 
sales contract and the finance company have become inseparable 
parts of the procedure whereby the merchant realizes immediately 
cash from the extended obligation of the purchaser from him. The 
very existence of the seller’s business depends on his ability to 
convert into cash these obligations and the finance company, 
standing ready and willing to buy them, has become not only an 
essential part of retail selling on the time payment plan but is in 
effect a department of the seller’s business, exercising a measure 
of control over the seller’s sales by the requirements laid down 
with regard to the negotiable paper proposed to be purchased.
In the course of this development an attempt has been made 
to project into the field of household law the law merchant orig­
inally designed for dealings between merchants. The fiction has 
been permitted to flourish that the finance company is a foreign 
and independent agency. When it does acquire the contracts which 
it was incorporated to buy and which it arranged to purchase 
before the contracts actually came into existence it attempts to 
shield itself behind the protection of the law merchant which 
can apply only, if at all, to one of the documents constituting 
the arrangement between the seller and the buyer; at the same 
time it takes unto itself all the advantages that can be drawn 
from the transaction out of which the note arose. It is beyond 
question that the promissory note is included in the documents 
required to be signed by the purchaser for the express purpose 
of enabling the finance company to avoid defences which would 
otherwise be available to the maker against his vendor and any 
assignee of his purchase obligation.112
The reception by other courts of Kelly J.A .’s close connection 
resulting in a common business venture theory has been mixed, 
and there is considerable uncertainty over how close the connec­
tions between the dealer and the finance company must be in 
order for the doctrine to apply.113
The question of the holder in due course status of a financing 
institution came before the Supreme Court of Canada again last 
year in Range v. Belvedere Finance C orp.1'4 Unfortunately, the 
Court made no mention of Kelly J.A .’s close connection theory, 
but decided the case on another now somewhat surprising 
ground.115 The Court held that where a finance company takes 
an assignment of both a conditional sale agreement and a promis­
112 Ibid., at pp. 321-322 (O.R.), 97-98 (D .L.R.).
113 See Crawford, Consum er Instalm ent Sales Financing Since Federal 
Discount L td. v. St. Pierre (1969), 19 U. Tor. L. J. 353.
114 (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
115 Cf. Ivan R. and Kristine Feltham, op. cir. supra, note 106, at p. 478.
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sory note, the conditional sale agreement and promissory note 
being separated only by a perforated line, the documentation must 
be read as a whole and, when read as a whole, the promise to pay 
was not unconditional and therefore neither the document nor any 
part of the document was a bill of exchange. The finance company 
could not then claim a holder in due course status. Pigeon J., 
speaking for the Court, distinguished the earlier Supreme Court 
decision in the Killoran case on the ground that the conditional 
sale agreement in that case contained a cut-off clause under which 
it was stipulated that any holder of the note was to be a holder in 
due course. The lesson for finance companies* of course, is to 
insert a cut-off clause. Indeed, perhaps all they need do is to 
use two completely separate pieces of paper.
It has been submitted that the only satisfactory solution is to 
enact legislation denying a holder in due course status and pro­
hibiting the use of cut-off clauses in consumer transactions.116 The 
main reason given for this is that financing institutions are in a 
much better position than consumers to exercise control over 
irresponsible dealers. I agree. Furthermore, we have already seen 
that there is a difference in the way the present law looks at sellers 
and lenders —  for example, the different rules relating to condi­
tional sales, chattel mortgages, and regulation of the cost of credit. 
It seems to me that financing institutions deliberately set up a trans­
action so as to get the best and avoid the worst of these two 
different worlds. By taking an assignment of the seller’s rights the 
finance company gets the best of his world, which usually means 
that the finance company will have more rights than it would 
if it were a direct loan transaction. By using cut-off clauses and 
negotiable instruments the finance company gets the best of the 
lender's world, in that it does not take subject to the equities be­
tween buyer and seller. It seems to me that financing institutions 
should not be able to have it both ways.
A U TH O R'S N O TE
In the jew  months gone by since this lecture was delivered  
Bill C-208 has been introduced in the House of Commons. Bill 
C -208 would amend the Bills of Exchange A ct by substantially 
eliminating the holder in due course status in consumer credit 
transactions.
The Bill does not, of course, deal with the other device relied 
on by financing institutions to insulate themselves from buyer de­
UB Promissory notes fall within federal jurisdiction, but cut-off clauses 
fall within provincial jurisdiction. See text, supra, accompanying 
note 4.
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fences, the cut-off clause. This is a matter of provincial jurisdic­
tion. Hopefully, New Brunswick will enact legislation to prohibit 
the use of cut-off clauses in consumer credit transactions.
Legislation denying a holder in due course status and pro­
hibiting cut-off clauses in consumer transactions may encourage 
financing institutions to rely even more heavily on disclaimer 
clauses. Disclaimer clauses, of course, prevent rights that assignees 
would take subject to from arising in the first place. See text, 
supra.
